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Casenote

United States v. Diaz: The Gap Between

Medication and Restoration

I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Diaz,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, in a case of first impression, determined whether the
state met its burden in applying the United States Supreme Court's test
articulated in Sell v. United States, to involuntarily medicate an
incompetent, schizophrenic defendant.' Based on the Sell test that was
established in 2003,4 the court of appeals had to determine which
evidentiary findings were sufficient to meet the clear and convincing
evidence standard allowing the State of Georgia to forcibly medicate the
appellant, Michael Diaz.' The court of appeals found no clear error in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia's
decision to involuntarily medicate Diaz based on evidence of Diaz's
uncooperative behavior and testimony concerning the effectiveness of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011).
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1317.
Sell, 539 U.S. at 169.
Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1317.
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alternatives. While involuntary medication may be Diaz's only chance
at restoring trial competency, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately made its
decision based on impersonal statistics lacking any practical guidelines.'
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2004, and again on April 8, 2004, a SouthTrust Bank
in Atlanta, Georgia, was robbed at gunpoint.' Michael A. Diaz was
arrested by the Atlanta Police Department while attempting to flee the
scene of the second robbery.' Diaz was subsequently charged with one
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,"o two counts of
armed bank robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime
of violence."
While his trial was pending in the Northern District of Georgia, Diaz
was examined by two doctors who disagreed about his competency.'2
Based on the testimony of both doctors at an October 2005 competency
hearing, the district court deemed Diaz competent to stand trial. 3
Diaz's motion to proceed pro se was granted so long as his court
appointed attorney, Timothy Saviello, remained as standby counsel.14
Furthermore, Diaz seemingly requested to waive his Sixth Amendment15 right to a jury trial, 6 which was also granted.17

6. Id. at 1335-36.
7. See id.
8. United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011).
9. United States v. Diaz, 540 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2008).
10. At the time of arrest, Diaz was "on supervised release for a prior conviction ... in
the Eastern District of Louisiana." Id. at 1317 n.2.
11. Id. at 1317.
12. Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1317. The Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida, found
Diaz to be competent after extensive interviews and psychological tests and even believed
his psychological problems could be fabricated. Diaz, 540 F.3d at 1318. Diaz told the
psychiatrist for the defense, Dr. Michael Hilton, that beginning at age thirteen his
personality had been "vanquished" and since had "re-earthed" as six different identities.
Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hilton believed Diaz was
suffering from "undifferentiated schizophrenia" and "was not competent to stand trial." Id.
(internal quotation marks omittted).
13. Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1318. Diaz informed the court that he did not believe in the
court's authority over him and at one point requested that his trial be heard in the
"International World Court." Diaz, 540 F.3d at 1320.
14. Diaz, 540 F.3d at 1319. "Standby counsel" may be appointed by a trial court in
order to assist the pro se defendant in his defense. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. Diaz refused to sign the required waiver, but because of his oral statements the
court allowed his attorney to sign instead. Diaz, 540 F.3d at 1320. These oral statements
from Diaz included that he did not "wish the jurors to be infringed upon," and when
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The district court held a bench trial in which Diaz was found guilty on
all five counts and was sentenced to 584 months of imprisonment.18
Diaz appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated Diaz's convictions and
remanded for further proceedings after determining that Diaz did not
knowingly waive his right to a jury trial."9
In May 2009, the district court held Diaz's second competency hearing.
This time he was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed
to the custody of the U.S. Attorney General for a maximum of four
months to determine whether competency to stand trial could be
attained. Four business days later, Diaz received notice of a Due
Process Involuntary Medication Hearing scheduled for June 3, 2009. At
the hearing, Dr. Carlos Tomelleri concluded that he could not approve
involuntary medication for Diaz because he was not likely to cause harm
to himself or others. 20 Dr. Tomelleri did, however, believe that medication would have a "substantial probability" of rendering Diaz legally
competent.2 1
Following the Due Process Involuntary Medication Hearing, the
district court held a hearing pursuant to the decision in Sell v. United
States22 on September 8, 2009, concerning involuntary medication for
the sole purpose of attaining trial competency of a nondangerous defendant.23 At the hearing, Diaz was found to suffer from schizophrenia
and, in light of testimony, government evidence, and assessment of the
Sell factors, the district court directed the Springfield Medical Center

pressed as to whether he wanted a jury his answer was, "I can have a jury. I can have a
jury. I mean you want me to choose .. . to be prosecuted?" Id. at 1321 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 1321.
18. Id. at 1323.
19. Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1318.
20. Id. at 1318-19.
21. Id. at 1319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
23. Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1319. The guidelines set forth in Sell require the government to
meet four criteria by clear and convincing evidence in order to involuntarily medicate a
defendant for the purposes of attaining trial competency. Id. at 1329. Under Sell, only
"essential or overriding" state interests may permit the government to involuntarily
medicate an incompetent defendant to attain trial competency. Id. at 1331 (quoting Sell,
539 U.S. at 178-79).
24. In order to involuntarily medicate an incompetent defendant for the sole purpose
of attaining trial competency, all four Sell factors must be found by the court: (1) important
government interests are at stake; (2) forced medication will significantly further the
government interests-that is, the medication is substantially likely to render the defendant
competent and substantially unlikely to interfere with the defendant's ability to assist
counsel; (3) involuntary medication is necessary to further the state interests and
alternative treatments are unlikely to reach comparable results; and (4) administering the
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to "first seek[] to obtain Mr. Diaz's voluntary participation" and then, if
he refused to cooperate, to forcibly medicate him.25 The district court
found that there were no alternatives to medication to restore competency, Diaz's crimes were serious and of important interest to the government, and Diaz was unlikely to cooperate in any other manner.26
Between all hearings and court appearances, Diaz spent time in
various government medical facilities. While at these facilities, Diaz
refused to participate in group activities, clinical testing, psychological
interviews, or questioning by doctors. He also refused to take any
medications regardless of doctor recommendation.
Diaz appealed the involuntary medication order, contending that the
government did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard
regarding the second and third Sell factors.28 Diaz filed a motion to
stay the order pending the appeal, and the motion was granted.29 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to involuntarily
medicate Diaz for the sole purpose of attaining trial competency. 30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The right to privacy and personal liberty are heavily cherished by the
citizens of the United States, as well as historically guarded by the
United States Supreme Court. Within the medical arena, individuals
are constitutionally granted, through the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments,3 ' the right to choose their personal course of medical
treatment with minimal limitation or government interference.3 2
Citizens also have the right to be fully aware of all risks involved with
their medical treatment through the doctrine of informed consent.

drugs is medically appropriate. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.
25. Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 1329-30.
27. Id. at 1317-20.
28. Id. at 1331
29. Id. at 1330.
30. Id. at 1335-36.
31. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
32. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (holding that a law or
provision of a law is invalid if it creates an undue burden on the individual-that is, if the
law's purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman's right to
choose an abortion before the fetus attains viability, then the law is unconstitutional);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (noting that competent
individuals have "a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment").
33. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 882. Informed consent includes explaining
truthful information about the nature of the procedure and all potential health risks to the
patient. Id.
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Early Interpretationof Involuntary Medication
Complex situations, such as the due process rights afforded to patients
of state mental institutions and the use of psychotropic drugs, complicate
inherent rights to privacy and individual liberty in personal medical
decisions.' In 1980, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio recognized, in Davis v. Hubbard," that a state mental
institution does not retain the unlimited power to involuntarily medicate
a confined person using psychotropic drugs unless the patient is found
to pose a danger to himself or others.36 In Davis, a patient brought suit
after he was restrained and forcibly given psychotropic medication.3
The district court recognized the right to refuse medication as a
fundamental liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The court
held that involuntary medication constitutes a "significant encroachment" on individual liberty, reasoning that the Constitution will tolerate
only those limits that afford the required procedural due process in
accord with the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9 The court did not acknowledge the medical obligations of the state to treat its patients, the safety
of medical personnel, or any other state interest, including the interest
in caring for its citizens, as justified reasons to force medication.4 0
However, the court noted an exception where the patient could be
involuntarily medicated with psychotropic medication if he posed a
danger to himself or others." Danger does not include a "remote
possibility" of danger but requires the actual existence of sufficiently
grave and imminent danger to permit forced medication.4 2 Because the
personal liberty in deciding the course of one's medical treatment is so
strongly guarded, the standard for any exception to this rule must be
extremely high. 3
Even more vague is the level of privacy and liberty protection afforded
to pretrial detainees and convicts. Broadly, the Supreme Court has held

A.

34. Psychotropic medications, or psychotherapeutic medications, are psychiatric
medications used to treat mental disorders. NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL
HEALTH MEDICATIONS 1 (Rev. 2008). Psychotropic medications are used to treat symptoms
rather than cure mental illness. Id.
35. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
36. Id. at 938.
37. Id. at 934.
38. Id. at 929.
39. Id. at 936.
40. Id. at 938.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 934-35.
43. Id. at 934.
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that "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison . . . and that they
may claim the protection of the Due Process Clause to prevent additional
4
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Therefore, lower courts are able to further determine which rights in
relation to involuntary medication shall be awarded to pretrial detainees
and those convicted.
In 1984 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held,
in Bee v. Greaves," that pretrial detainees retain the constitutional
liberty interest of avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medications.
While this right was not considered absolute, the Tenth Circuit opted to
balance the state interests and the demands of organized society in favor
of the constitutionally-provided liberty interests of the detainee.
When the defendant, Daniel Howard Bee, was awaiting trial, he began
having hallucinations and was moved to a state mental health facility.
While in the facility, he was prescribed and voluntarily ingested
antipsychotic medications for his schizophrenia. During this time, he
was found competent to stand trial. Bee soon complained about the side
effects of the medication, which the facility acknowledged, and he
refused to take the pills for a period of five days. When the lead
physician noted that Bee was beginning to show signs of schizophrenia
again, he ordered the staff to restrain and forcibly inject Bee with
medication; the physician threatened to do so until Bee cooperated and
resumed taking the medication orally. Bee later brought suit to
determine whether the state and the facility infringed upon his rights
by forcibly medicating him."
In Bee, the Tenth Circuit recognized the fundamental liberty interest
in the right to privacy and the right to avoid unwanted medical
treatment. 49 However, because Bee was in state custody awaiting trial,
the court acknowledged the state interests involved.so Using reasoning
similar to the court in Davis, the Tenth Circuit held that the state had
no duty to treat detainees' mental issues unless treatment was desired
and that the facility had no duty to attain or maintain the detainees'
competency to stand trial without any type of court instruction.5 1 The

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1394.
Id.
Id. at 1389-90.
Id. at 1394.
Id.
Id. at 1395.
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state's interest in maintaining Bee's competency was not sufficiently
legitimate to override the constitutional right of the detainee to refuse
treatment." The only exception noted in Bee is that of emergency; in
an emergency situation, if medication is the least drastic alternative, the
state may have a legitimate interest in the needs of the detainee and
those in his presence to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs."
B. The United States Supreme Court and the Evolution of
Involuntary Medication
While lower courts evaluated and recognized the due process
protection afforded to those fundamental liberties retained by all and the
various exceptions limiting those rights," the United States Supreme
Court remained silent concerning the specific issue of involuntary
medication of convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees until its 1990
decision in Washington v. Harper." In Harper, a mentally ill prison
inmate claimed that the state violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights by administering antipsychotic drugs against his will.56
The Court acknowledged the importance of the liberty interests protected
by the Constitution, as did lower courts deciding on similar issues, which
are retained by all citizens, including prisoners." The sensitive issue
of prison environments led the Court to ultimately hold that "the Due
Process Clause permits the [sitate to treat a prison inmate who has a
serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the
inmate's medical interest.""
Therefore, for the first time, the Court determined that prisoners' due
process rights extend to rejecting medication and that the state
maintains the right to involuntarily medicate with appropriate
medication only where the inmate poses a danger to himself or others."
Accordingly, situations involving involuntarily medicating mentally ill
inmates require a balance of the inmate's liberty interests in refusing
the drug and the state's interest in appropriately medicating the inmate,

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., id at 1394.

55. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id.
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while also protecting the individual inmate and those around him from
potential danger.6 0
Two years later, the involuntary medication analysis was refined by
the Court in Riggins v. Nevada.6 1 In Riggins, a schizophrenic, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, appealed his conviction by
arguing that his conviction was unfairly biased due to being involuntarily medicated while in state custody.6 2 Riggins asserted that his
insanity defense failed because, as a result of being forcibly medicated,
the jury was unable to see his true personality." The Court held that,
to administer antipsychotic drugs against the defendant's will, the state
must first show that no less intrusive alternatives existed, the medication was appropriate for his condition, and the medication was essential
for the safety of the defendant and others." In contrast to the opinion
in Harper,the Court in Riggins evaluated the rights of a convicted felon
as opposed to a pretrial detainee." While the Court relied on the
principles first analyzed in Harper,the Riggins decision raised the level
of scrutiny applied in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
application to pre-trial detainees.66 Furthermore, the Court's opinion
in Riggins required the state's consideration of less intrusive alternatives to forced medication to further protect the detained individual's
rights. 67
Most recently, in Sell v. United States," the Court addressed the
involuntary use of antipsychotic medications to render nondangerous
defendants competent to stand trial and its constitutional impact on a
defendant's liberty to refuse such treatment. 6 9 The opinion in Sell
established a standard that allows the state to involuntarily medicate a
defendant for the sole purpose of attaining trial competency.7 o The
Court set out the standard in four factors. First, the government must
have an important interest at stake.7 ' This factor is evaluated by
reviewing the seriousness of the crime, the government's need for public

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 236.
504 U.S. 127 (1992).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 157 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's departure from Harper).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 135 (majority opinion).
539 U.S. 166 (2003).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
Id.
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security, and the defendant's right to a fair trial." Second, involuntary
The
medication must significantly further the state interests.
medication must be substantially likely to cause the defendant to attain
trial competency, as well as substantially unlikely to have side effects
that would render the defendant unable to assist in his own counsel.
Third, the involuntary medication must be necessary to further state
interests." This also requires that less intrusive alternatives to forced
medication are unlikely to reach the same result or would be wholly
ineffective. 76 Fourth, the medication used must be "medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical
condition." 7
The requirements established in Sell are only evaluated when the
government seeks to involuntarily medicate a nondangerous defendant
for the sole purpose of attaining competency to stand trial.7 1 If
involuntary medication is warranted for any other reason, such as the
defendant's dangerousness to himself and others, it is unnecessary to
determine whether the Sell factors are met and irrelevant to determine
whether attaining competency is a legitimate interest of the state.
Since the Sell decision in 2003, the Supreme Court has not granted
certiorari in any Sell-related case. Various courts have applied the
Supreme Court standard and have more narrowly, however not
uniformly, construed the details of each factor.o For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not rely on
statistical data concerning restoration while conducting a Sell hearing;
rather, based on evidence that the defendant had previously been
restored to trial competency with the administration of medication, the
court determined that medication was substantially likely to have the
same effect in the future." The Tenth Circuit made special note in its
analysis of the rare and limited circumstances the Supreme Court spoke

72. Id. For example, if a defendant refuses to take medication, his institutional
confinement may be extended, and he would present less of a threat to the security of the
public. Id.
73. Id. at 181.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 181-82.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 604-05 (3d Cir. 2008); United States
v. Valenzuela-Puentes, 479 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. RiveraGuerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sell, 529 U.S. at 181).
81. Grape, 549 F.3d at 604-05.
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of in Sell when discussing the frequency of involuntarily medicating
nondangerous, incompetent individuals." Heeding the warning against
over-application, the Tenth Circuit remanded, instructing the district
court to consider the defendant's extremely low level of intelligence in
determining the likelihood of competency restoration.8 3
In United States v. Rivera-Guerrero," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the court was required to
consider the specific medication, the medication's unique side effects, and
the medical appropriateness when conducting a Sell hearing.' The
court focused on the specificities of the medication, not the specificities
of the individual defendant.86 At the same time, however, the Ninth
Circuit stressed the disfavor of Sell orders because of the importance of
protecting individual liberty interests as well as the powerful impact of
antipsychotic medications.
Issues have also been addressed concerning procedural aspects of
conducting Sell hearings, such as in United States v. Algere.88 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
clarified by ruling that when a judge is present for a Sell hearing,
whether physically or via video teleconference, the defendant's constitutional right to judicial presence is not violated. While this court
and others have clarified and construed some issues regarding Sell
hearings, uniformity among districts and circuits does not exist, and the
Supreme Court has yet to further define the requirements of the Sell
test.
IV.

THE CouRT's RATIONALE

In an effort to establish the burden required for involuntarily
medicating an incompetent defendant for the sole purpose of attaining
trial competency, the Eleventh Circuit evaluated this case of first
impression and determined that the government met its burden of clear
and convincing evidence, affirming the district court's decision to

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Valenzuela-Puentes, 479 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 169, 180).
Id. at 1229.
426 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1337-38.
457 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. La. 2005).
Id. at 701.
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involuntarily medicate Michael Diaz."o The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari on October 3, 2011.91
For the first time since the Supreme Court decided Sell v. United
States,92 the Eleventh Circuit was required to determine whether the
government met its burden regarding the second and third Sell
94
factors.9 3 The issue for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Diaz
was whether the state could involuntarily medicate Diaz for the sole
purpose of attaining trial competency." Following decisions from other
circuits," the court of appeals reviewed the Sell factors in question
under a clear error standard of review." Also based on decisions from
other circuits, the court of appeals concluded that the government's
burden of proof is that of clear and convincing evidence."
The Second Sell Factor
The second Sell factor required the court to determine whether
involuntarily medicating a detainee to attain competency would
"significantly further the government's interest."9 9 This required the
court to consider whether forced medication was substantially likely to
render the defendant, Diaz, competent, and whether the medication was
substantially unlikely to cause side effects that would interfere with
Diaz's ability to assist in his own counsel.100
At Diaz's hearing to determine if the Sell factors had been met, two
medical experts who personally analyzed Diaz testified that, with
appropriate medication, they believed Diaz's chance to be restored to
competency ranged between 60% and 70%, or 40% and 90%.101 The

A.

90. United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2011).
91. Diaz v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011).
92. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
93. See Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1331.
94. 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011).
95. Id. at 1317.
96. Id. at 1330-31. The Court of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, and now Eleventh Circuits have held that the first Sell factor is reviewed de novo,
while the second, third, and fourth are reviewed under a clear error standard of review.
See id. The Tenth Circuit has held that the first two Sell factors are reviewed de novo, and
the third and fourth are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1331 (citing United States v.
Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (10th Cir. 2005)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1331. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit had previously
addressed the burden of proof to be used in cases arising under Sell; however, other circuits
unanimously applied the burden of clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 1330-31.
99. Id. at 1332.
100. Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181).
101. Id. at 1320-22.
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testimony, therefore, indicated the possibility of a 60% chance of being
unable to attain competency.'02 These results were based on various
statistical studies of incompetent patients treated with antipsychotic
medication.103 The medical experts testified that these results were
what they considered a substantial likelihood of rendering competence,
and the district court agreed.'0 4
On appeal, Diaz contended that competency restoration rates were
actually only between 40% and 70%, based in part on the expert
testimony and medical data, and, according to related judicial decisions,o' did not meet the burden of a substantial likelihood of restoring competency to stand trial.'o' The Eleventh Circuit found no error
in the district court's decision as to the second Sell factor.' 7 The court
explained that the low rates Diaz argued as his likelihood to reach
competency to stand trial were actually success rates in restoring
patients to a level of stable remission.0' Stable remission, the court
noted, was not the goal of involuntarily medicating an incompetent
defendant.1o' The goal, rather, was to merely attain trial competency,
which experts and medical data determined was easier to attain than
stable remission.110 Notably, it was opined at an early competency
hearing that Diaz's IQ"' was 79, but this fact was never analyzed

102. Id. at 1322.
103. Id.

104. Id. at 1332-33.
105. A predicted 70% success rate is generally considered substantially likely. Id. at
1332 (citing United States v. Nicklas, 623 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, a prediction of a 5-10% success
rate is not considered substantially likely. Id. at 1333 (citing United States v. Ghane, 392
F.3d 317, 319-20 (8th Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 1332-33.
107. Id. at 1332.
108. Id. at 1333.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. IQ, or intelligence quotient, determines a person's general intellectual functioning.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 41 (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed., text rev. 2000). IQ is determined by

standardized, individualized intelligence tests. Id. Generally, those with IQ's from 50-55
to approximately 70 suffer from mild mental retardation. Id. at 42. Depending on the test
administered, there is generally a 5 point measurement error in IQ tests, meaning an IQ
assessment of 70 is considered to represent a range of 65-75. Id. at 41-42. Therefore, with
accompanying adaptive behavioral deficits a person with an IQ of 75 could be deemed
mentally retarded. Id. Such behavioral deficits must exist in at least two skill areas,
which include the following: "communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety." Id. at 41.
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further in assessing whether or not he personally had a substantial
Therefore, the Eleventh
likelihood of competency restoration.112
Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding Diaz's 60-87%
chance of successfully being restored to trial competency substantially
likely.113
Diaz also contended that the government failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that his medical treatment was substantially
The government recognized the
unlikely to cause side effects."
potential side effects of the medication they intended to use and also
presented alternative plans if Diaz displayed those side effects."'
However, pursuant to Sell, most effects should not be at issue.16
Rather, the side effects that should be analyzed by the court are those
that could prevent Diaz from being able to assist in his own defense,
which would render his trial unfair.1 7 The Eleventh Circuit held that
there was no error in the district court's determination that the
government met its burden regarding the second Sell factor because Diaz
would be given a medication that he could not prove was likely to cause
severe side effects, he would be closely monitored by the facility for
harmful side effects, and the potential side effects were substantially
unlikely to prevent Diaz from assisting in his own defense."' Therefore, according to the Eleventh Circuit, there was no error in the district
court's determination that the government met its burden as to the
second Sell factor."'
B.

The Third Sell Factor
The third Sell factor addresses whether involuntarily medicating an
incompetent defendant is "necessary to further the government's
interests." 20 The court in Diaz was required to analyze whether
alternative, less intrusive treatments were unlikely to reach the same
result as forced medication.' 2 ' Further, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether "less intrusive means for administering the drugs, such as

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See United States v. Diaz, 540 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008).
Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1332-33.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86).
Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 185-86).
Id. at 1333-34.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id. at 1334; Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1334-35 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181).
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a court order backed by the power of contempt" were available options
122
prior to implementing intrusive, forced methods of medication.
Diaz contended that the government did not meet the burden of clear
and convincing evidence as to the third Sell factor because of the state's
Diaz argued
expeditious attempts to medicate him involuntarily."
his medicatake
to
him
convincing
of
alternative
that a "less-intrusive
tion" was the appropriate procedure to follow.'
Diaz asserted that,
in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Sell, alternatives
should have first been attempted before involuntary medication. Such
alternatives, according to Diaz, included building a stable relationship
between Diaz and his therapist and having medical staff attempt to
convince him to voluntarily take medication. 25 While the court of
appeals recognized the minimal effort made by the state in pursuing
alternatives during the period of time between the due process hearing
and Sell hearings, the court rested its decision on Diaz's long-term
behavior."12

The Eleventh Circuit traced Diaz's rebellious behavior back to July
2008.127 Upon his initial admission to a state medical center, Diaz
refused to take doctor-recommended medication and would not participate in any programs the facility offered. Six months later, he refused
a doctor's attempts to interact with him through interviews, psychological tests, and questioning about his background. Furthermore, in
preparation for his Sell hearing, Diaz refused to cooperate with all
doctors in interviews and stated that he did not believe in medication. 8
Experts testified that psychotherapyl 29 alone would be ineffective in
treating Diaz because schizophrenia is caused by a chemical imbalance,
which requires medication to treat."1o Diaz also made clear throughout
his various hearings that he did not acknowledge the authority of any
court, 3 1 so a court order to require his participation would probably
not compel his cooperation.' 32 Because Diaz refused to participate in

122. Id. at 1335 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1335-36.
127. Id. at 1335.
128. Id.
129. Psychotherapy includes one-on-one conversations between a patient and a
therapist. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Diaz, 540 F.3d at 1320.
132. Diaz, 630 F.3d at 1335.
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any state attempt to attain competency for an extended period of time,
not just when involuntary medication was sought by the state, and
because alternatives were deemed ineffective, the court of appeals found
no error in the district court's holding that the third Sell factor was met
by clear and convincing evidence.'a
On review, the court of appeals found no error by the district court
concerning the two Sell factors questioned by Diaz.'34 The court
ultimately interpreted the language in Sell to determine that Diaz could
be forcibly medicated in an attempt to attain trial competency.'s
Where the government shows by clear and convincing evidence that an
incompetent defendant is substantially likely to be restored to competency, that side effects are unlikely to cause the defendant to be unable to
participate in his defense, and that less intrusive alternatives would be
ineffective due to the defendant's behavior, the incompetent defendant
can be involuntarily medicated. 3 1
V. IMPLICATIONS

While forced medication may restore incompetent, nondangerous
defendants who otherwise refuse treatment, the current state of the
Sell'3 7 analysis lacks guidance, and the definition of a "substantial
likelihood" continues to be ambiguous. Courts that have held Sell
hearings to date have heeded the concern for over-application of forced
medication, but without further instruction, the Sell factors alone do not
place a strict barrier between the constitutional liberties of the
individual and the government interest in attaining trial competency to
adequately determine eligibility of involuntary medication. Without a
more sophisticated analysis of each individual incompetent defendant,
a risk of an inadvertent violation of their constitutionally protected
liberties remains present. Other than the first factor of the Sell test,
which evaluates the seriousness of the crime and the state interest in
prosecution, evidence of the remaining Sell factors can only be determined and analyzed directly through psychiatric testimony. 38
The second factor of the Sell test, which was one portion of Diaz's
appeal, requires expert psychiatric testimony as to whether there is a

133. Id. at 1335-36.
134. Id. at 1334-35.
135. Id. at 1335-36.

136. Id.
137. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
138. Gregory B. Leong, Commentary: Restorability of Incompetence to Stand Trial-ImplicationsBeyond Predictive Equations, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 44, 44
(2007).
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substantial likelihood that involuntary medication will restore the
defendant's competence without causing side effects that will significantly interfere with the defendant's ability to assist counsel.139 The
second factor appears to be the least straightforward textually and in
reality requires a more thorough analysis and understanding. Given the
complexity of the second factor, determining the likelihood of competency
restoration, the level of textual ambiguity and lack of medical direction
available to judges as well as psychiatrists is surprising.'40 While
medication may begin to bridge the gap between an incompetent
defendant and trial competency, it is only the beginning. A true
determination of the likelihood of restorability requires a personalized
analysis of the incompetent individual based on his or her individual
characteristics. Medicine may only make certain steps towards trial
competency if the individual has personal limitations that medication
cannot repair, and Sell may allow courts to overlook those individual
characteristics that create a gap between medication and trial competency restoration.14 '
Perplexing as it may be, there is far more information available
concerning the less commonly raised issue of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" than that available on competency to stand trial.'42 Currently, "defendants hospitalized for competence restoration occupy ...
one ninth of the nation's state psychiatric hospital beds."14 3 Even
though competency restoration is common in our criminal justice system,
"no jurisdiction has established legal guidelines concerning testimony
about potential restoration."'" Lacking guidelines, uniform requirements, or individually based analysis, courts still "rarely disagree with
the opinions of mental health professionals.""' Even though judges
rely so heavily on mental health experts in their determination of
competency and the substantial likelihood of restoration, very little

139. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
140. Leong, supra note 138, at 44.
141. See Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restorationof Competence to Stand
Trial from a Clinical Perspective, 31 N. ENGL. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 86
(2005). For example, even mildly retarded incompetent defendants generally will not
receive all the potential benefits of medication, as opposed to an incompetent defendant
with no personal limitation. Id.
142. Leong, supra note 138, at 46.
143. Douglas Mossman, PredictingRestorabilityof Incompetent CriminalDefendants,
35 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 34, 34-35 (2007).
144. Id. at 35.
145. Karen L. Hubbard, Patricia A. Zapf& Kathleen A.Ronan, Competency Restoration:
An Examination of the Differences Between Defendants Predicted Restorable and Not
Restorable to Competency, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 128 (2003).
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attention is given to an expert's ability to accurately make such a
prediction. 4 ' While courts have not determined the specific requirements of statistics and testimony, some jurisdictions have discussed
what constitutes a substantial likelihood of rendering competency.147
However, there seems to be little uniformity in the opinions. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a 70%
chance of competence restoration was substantial," while the Tenth
Circuit has held that an 80% chance was substantial.'4 9 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that 76% to
Notably, the United States District
93% was an appropriate range.'
Court for the Southern District of California found a "more likely than
not" chance of restoration insubstantial.'
Experts may testify about the results of any study, their experience,
any personal characteristics of the particular defendant, or anything else
they feel appropriate. There is no uniform requirement as to what
information may be considered by the court in its determination of a
"substantial likelihood," and therefore, the court may be misled by
meaningless percentages. Examiners are generally poor at predicting
those defendants who will regain competency and those who will
not.'52 No matter what data is available, its applicability to a certain
defendant is highly uncertain. 53 The greatest possible assumption is
that similar groups will have similar results, but even if a large portion
of the test group was restored to competency with medication, it is still
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict where any particular
incompetent defendant will lie on the response curve. 5 4 Because of
this general group analysis, clinicians over-predict restorability in
particular individuals."
Without an extremely sophisticated model,
which does not yet exist, predicted outcomes for a specific incompetent
defendant are nearly impossible to ascertain.15 6

146. Robert A. Nicholson et al., Predicting Treatment Outcome for Incompetent
Defendants, 22 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 367, 368 (1994).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 552 (6th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1115 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157,
161-62 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1141 (S.D.
Cal. 2005).
148. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 161-62.
149. Bradley, 417 F.3d at 1115.
150. Green, 532 F.3d at 552.
151. Rivera-Morales, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
152. Hubbard, supra note 145, at 127.
153. Pinals, supra note 141, at 104-06.
154. Id. at 105-06.
155. Id. at 105.
156. Id. at 105-06.
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For example, in Diaz's Sell hearing, various doctors testified and gave
the court statistics related to the likelihood of his restorability.157 One
physician testified that, in her experience, between 60% and 70% of
58
Another
patients were restored to competency with medication.
involuninvolving
cases
physician testified that, in his experience with
and
75%
tary medication for the purpose of trial competency, between
80% of individuals medicated reached the level of trial competency.' 9
The psychiatrist also summarized several studies that indicated 95%,
87%, 75%, and 77% success rates, respectively, in various cases of
psychotic patients and competency restoration.1o These percentages
were all based solely on group outcomes and made no mention of
personal characteristics such as age, psychological history, cognitive
impairment, intellect, or any other pertinent factors.' 6 ' This psychiatrist further testified that, while it was his most pessimistic estimate,
there was potentially a 60% chance of Diaz failing to attain trial
The broad range of statistics provided to the court in
competency.'
Diaz lacked any detail that showed that Diaz, as a unique individual,
was considered in an involuntary medication analysis. Further, due to
the unavailability of Diaz's medical records prior to his charges and the
lack of discussion concerning his IQ and other personal characteristics,
it seems possible that the court determined a "substantial likelihood"
Because of the lack of required
based solely on impersonal data.'
assertions based on completely
psychiatrists'
or
evidence,
testimony
impersonal data are admissible and heavily relied upon by the court in
making critical Sell decisions."
Studies such as those in Diaz may be a good starting point for the
court in its analysis of whether the prosecution has met its burden in
showing a substantial likelihood of competence restoration. However,
studies alone are too likely to lack consideration of other possible
characteristics that must be overcome to bridge the gap between
medically-induced improvements and restored trial competency. It must
be remembered that not all incompetent defendants are alike. Judges
tend to place great faith and reliance on the testimony of psychiatrists

157. United States v. Diaz, 630 F.2d 1314, 1320-22 (11th Cir. 2011).
158. Id. at 1320.
159. Id. at 1321.
160. Id. at 1322.
161. See id. at 1321-22.
162. Id. at 1322.
163. See id. at 1332-34. Conclusions were based on statistical studies of groups of
incompetent patients with varying disorders, medical histories, personal characteristics,
and medical treatment avenues. See id.
164. Nicholson, supra note 146, at 368.
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for Sell purposes,' and further, clinicians tend to over-predict restorability."6 ' One state study found that "clinicians were wrong in
predicting treatment outcomes of 85 percent of the defendants who
ultimately were not restored.""' Noting these faults, researchers and
psychiatrists seem to be looking for answers. For example, Dr. Douglas
Mossman completed a successful study by creating a complex equation
that considered demographic and diagnostic variables,' resulting in
a personalized determination of the likelihood of attaining trial
Other studies showed differences between those
competency.6 9
restored to trial competency and those not restored after medication-the
differences being nonpsychiatric variables.7 o At present, there are few
reliable findings that even address the issue of accuracy in predictions
of who will successfully be restored to trial competency. 7'
Forced medication may fully restore Michael Diaz and many other
incompetent defendants who otherwise would refuse treatment to the
level of trial competency. However, the "substantial likelihood" of
competence restorability standard is currently ambiguous and appears
to generally be measured and explained to the court based on impersonal
statistics. Psychiatrists have noted the lack of practical guidelines
available to them in determining the likelihood of competence restoration
and some have made steps to narrow these gap.
In the meantime, however, courts are left to analyze statistics with
questionable value to determine whether the state has met its burden
of proving a substantial likelihood of trial competence restoration. Until
a reliable measurement tool is created or the Supreme Court further
construes the Sell test to remove the ambiguity, a dangerous potential
exists for the unacknowledged gaps between incompetence, medicallyinduced improvement, and trial competency to remain unbridged. Under
the current methodology, every incompetent defendant is at risk of an
arbitrary violation of his or her constitutionally protected liberty
interests.
BRYSON MCCOLLUM

165. Id.
166. Pinals, supra note 141, at 105.
167. Mossman, supra note 143, at 35.
168. Id. at 38. Variables included charge, age at admission, mental retardation, having
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, number of previous hospitalizations, cumulative
previous hospitalizations, non-African-American ethnicity, and having a substance use
disorder, all of which reduced the likelihood of restoration. Id.
169. See id.
170. Hubbard, supra note 145, at 127.
171. Pinals, supra note 141, at 105.
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